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THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF ARBITRAL
DETERMINATIONS IN SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL
SECURITIES LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925' (Arbitration Act) demonstrates
a strong policy favoring the availability of speedy and efficient methods
of dispute resolution.2 The Securities Exchange Act of 19343 (Exchange
Act) was designed to ensure investor protection in the securities indus-
try4 and it gives injured parties recourse to the federal courts.5 A conflict
exists between the right to enforce an agreement to arbitrate securities
disputes and the right to bring claims under the Exchange Act in federal
court.6 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict, in part, when it held
that pendent state law claims' must be submitted to arbitration, even
1. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982)). The Arbitration Act was created to guarantee access to a swift and efficient alter-
native to judicial dispute resolution by making agreements to arbitrate valid and enforce-
able. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text
2. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) ("The United States Arbitration Act
establishes by statute the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications
of litigation."); see also infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
3. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1982)).
4. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
5. The Exchange Act both expressly and implicitly creates in the investor a right to
sue for violations of the statute. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (creation of
express civil liabilities); see also infra note 110 and accompanying text judicial creation
of an implied right of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
6. In determining the arbitrability of claims under the Securities Act, the Supreme
Court highlighted the competing statutory concerns.
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case. Congress has
afforded participants in transactions subject to its legislative power an opportu-
nity generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate solution of controver-
sies through arbitration if the parties are willing to accept less certainty of
legally correct adjustment. On the other hand, it has enacted the Securities Act
to protect the rights of investors and has forbidden a waiver of any of those
rights.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (footnote omitted); see also Note, Mixed Arbi-
trable and Nonarbitrable Claims In Securities Litigation: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 34 Cath. U.L. Rev. 525, 534 (1985) [hereinafter Mixed Claims] (clash between
policy protecting investors and policy enforcing arbitration agreements).
7. Pendent state securities law and common law claims such as breach of contract,
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are arbitrable. See Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717
F.2d 314, 320-21 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, common law negligence and violations of state securities laws are subject to
arbitration pursuant to a valid predispute agreement); Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc.,
661 F.2d 638, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1981) (various state law claims arbitrable); Timberlake v.
Oppenheimer & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,336 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (arbitration
required as to claims of common law fraud and deceptive business practices); see also
Note, The Severability of Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Securities Claims, 41 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 1165, 1166-67 (1984) [hereinafter Severability of Claims] ("Securities claims
based on state law generally are subject to arbitration pursuant to valid arbitration
agreements.").
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though federal jurisdiction may be exercised over Exchange Act claims.'
By endorsing parallel proceedings in different fora,9 however, the deci-
sion whether an issue determination in arbitration has preclusive effect1°
on subsequent federal securities litigation was left to the district courts. I"
To resolve this issue, the courts need to balance the federal interest in
providing a forum for victims of violations of the securities laws, 2
8. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). In Byrd, the
defendant assumed that the plaintiff's federal securities law claims were nonarbitrable
and did not move to compel arbitration of those claims. Id. at 215. The Court, therefore,
addressed the issue of whether to compel arbitration of pendent state law claims when the
federal claim is heard in federal court. Id. at 216. The Court declined to resolve the issue
of whether claims under the Exchange Act may be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 216
n.1. The arbitrability of claims arising under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), is unresolved among the circuit courts of appeals. Eight
circuits have adopted a rule that claims brought under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act are
not arbitrable. See Bustamante v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 802 F.2d 815, 816 (5th Cir. 1986);
Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1038 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Jacobson v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fener & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d Cir. 1986); Cono-
ver v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986); McMahon v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60
(1986); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1979);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 829 (10th Cir.
1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 836 (7th
Cir. 1977). Two circuits have adopted the contrary position that claims under § 10(b)
may be submitted to arbitration. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden,
Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
to decide this issue. See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). If the Court determines that actions under
§ 10(b) may not be submitted to arbitration, the resultant bifurcated proceedings will
place the determination of the preclusive effect of the arbitration of related claims in the
hands of the district courts. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. A decision
holding that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under § 10(b) are valid will re-
quire lower courts to consider the application of preclusion to bifurcated cases currently
pending in the federal courts. A determination of the arbitrability of § 10(b) is beyond
the scope of this Note. For an analysis of this issue see, Note, Arbitrability of Claims
Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 Duke L.J. 548 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Arbitrability of Claims].
9. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985); id. at 225
(White, J., concurring).
10. Preclusion is a judically created doctrine that restricts parties from relitigating
claims or issues previously determined. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
See generally 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§§ 4401-4426 (1981) [hereinafter Wright] (discussing rules of preclusion).
11. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985) (district courts
must frame preclusion rules in light of relevant federal interests). Since Byrd, at least one
district court has addressed the preclusive effect of arbitration in the context of the fed-
eral securities laws. In O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 C 3181,
slip op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1987), the court stated that to preserve the effectiveness of
arbitration, issues determined therein should be given some preclusive effect in federal
court. Id. at 7. On the facts of the case, however, the court held that issue preclusion
could not be applied. Id. at 10.
12. Where a right of action has been created by federal statute and federal courts are
given jurisdiction to hear the claims, there exists a federal interest in protecting access to
the federal forum. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1984); see
also Note, The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
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against the public interest in judicial economy"3 and finality. 14
In the context of other statutory rights, 5 the Supreme Court has held
that when there is a federal interest in protecting a judicial forum for
resolution of the statutory claim,' 6 and arbitration cannot adequately
protect that claim,17 issue preclusion may not be raised as a bar to federal
consideration of the issue.18 Thus, courts must address two issues to de-
cide whether preservation of a judicial forum for securities claims re-
quires a similar bar to the application of preclusion. The first is whether
the implied right of action19 under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act2"
creates a federal jurisidictional interest.2' The second is whether the ar-
bitral proceedings adequately protect that interest.'
This Note proposes a framework to identify appropriate circumstances
for applying preclusive effect to arbitral determinations. This framework
accommodates the concerns of the Exchange Act,' the Arbitration
Act24 and judicial concerns of economy and finality.2" Part I of this Note
over Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 961
(1971) [hereinafter Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction] ("A federal court must first consider
its obligation to protect its exclusive jurisdiction.").
13. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (issue preclusion
promotes judicial economy); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971) (public interest in judicial efficiency is a motivating
factor in applying rules of preclusion); 18 Wright, supra note 10, § 4403, at 13-14 (preclu-
sion promotes public policy of judicial economy).
14. See 18 Wright, supra note 10, § 4403, at 15 ("The deepest interests underlying the
conclusive effect of prior adjudication draw from the purpose to provide a means of fi-
nally ending private disputes."); lB J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Federal Practice,
0.405[2], at 189-90 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Moore] (underlying policy of preclusion "is
the objective of judicial finality").
15. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 285 (1984) (action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 729-30 (1981)
(action under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 38 (1974) (action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
16. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974).
17. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984) (arbitration cannot
provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings of rights under § 1983); Barren-
tine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743-46 (1981) (arbitral procedures are
less protective of statutory rights); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-58
(1974) (inadequacy of procedures makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for the de-
termination of statutory rights).
18. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974). For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part 1I.
19. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); see also infra note 110
and accompanying text (discussion of implied right of action under § 10(b)).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
21. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
23. The Exchange Act is designed to protect investors from fraud and manipulation
in the securities industry. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.
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examines the history of arbitration and its role in the modem securities
industry. Part II analyzes the judicial doctrine of issue preclusion and
explores Supreme Court precedent in analogous areas of law. Part III
reviews the legislative history of the Exchange Act, the overriding federal
interest that guarantees a forum for actions arising under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and the procedural limitations of arbitration. Part IV
concludes that the federal jurisdictional interest in hearing claims under
section 10(b) limits the application of issue preclusion. It then proposes
guidelines for identifying circumstances when preclusion would be
appropriate.
I. THE POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
Historically,26 American courts denied enforcement of contract provi-
sions mandating arbitration of disputes arising out of the contract.27
Although faced with changing social conditions28 and an increasingly
congested judicial system,29 American courts felt constrained to follow
26. Arbitration has existed as a means of dispute resolution for centuries. See Al-
lison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accomoda-
tion of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 219, 222 (1986) (arbitration is of
ancient origin); Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev.
155, 155 (1970) ("Long before laws were established, or courts were organized.., men
had resorted to arbitration for the resolving of discord, the adjustment of differences, and
the settlement of disputes."); Sayre, Development of CommercialArbitration Law, 37 Yale
L.J. 595, 597 (1927) (arbitration was an authorized dispute resolution mechanism as far
back as the seventh century).
27. American judges in the nineteenth century were "hostile to arbitration." See
Mixed Claims, supra note 6, at 528-29. American reluctance to enforce arbitration agree-
ments was largely a product of English precedent. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Am-
torg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942). English courts were jealous for
their jurisdiction and refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate. See id. at 985 (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (considering the enactment of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act)). Their reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements has been at-
tributed, in part, to "the desire of the judges, at a time when their salaries came largely
from fees, to avoid loss of income." Id. at 983. This philosophy became strongly embed-
ded in English precedent and was subsequently adopted by American courts. See id. at
985 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)); see also Insurance Co. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("[A]greements in advance to oust the courts
of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void."); Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F.
639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1898) (arbitration agreement unenforceable because it would oust
courts of their jurisdiction); Dickson Mfg. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 119 F. 488,
490 (M.D. Pa. 1902) (parties may not contract to "oust the courts of their jurisdiction").
28. The 1920's were characterized by a diversification of occupations, an influx of
immigrants, an increasing population and an ever growing number of new enterprises, all
resulting in multitudinous controversies. See Letter from Judge Moses H. Grossman,
Executive Head of the Arbitration Society of America, to Hon. William Draper Lewis,
Secretary, the American Law Institute (Dec. 24, 1923), quoted in Jones, Historical Devel-
opment of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 240, 257 n.64
(1928).
29. See Allison, supra note 26, at 226 (congested court dockets in the early twentieth
century resulted in long delays in the litigation of commercial disputes); Jones, supra note
28, at 258 (" 'On January 1, 1923, 27,000 untried cases were on the supreme court calen-
dars in New York County. Using every effort, the court can dispose of about 8,000 cases
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this precedent.3" Pressured by the business community, 31 Congress en-
acted the Federal Arbitration Act of 192532 and formally recognized ar-
bitration as a valid alternative to judicial dispute resolution.33
The Arbitration Act required' 4 federal courts to refer to arbitration all
claims arising out of contracts containing a valid arbitration clause,35 and
thereby granted such agreements the same status as other contractual
a year. On the other hand, about 13,000 new cases are being added to the calendar each
year.' ") (quoting "Peoples' Courts" of Arbitration, Literary Dig., Oct. 4, 1924, at 14);
Mixed Claims, supra note 6, at 529 ("As the country grew... the courts became con-
gested . ")-
30. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d
Cir. 1942) (" 'The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be over-
turned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule
and recongized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it.' ") (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)); see also id at 984 ("The lower federal
courts, feeling bound to comply with the precedents, nevertheless became critical of this
judicial hostility."); Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) (although viewing the old rule as anachronistic, the court felt constrained to follow
prior decisions holding arbitration agreements unenforceable), aff'd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir.
1924); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006,
1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (criticizing the custom of standing upon "the antiquity of the rule
[rather] than upon its excellence or reason").
31. American businessmen pressed for more rapid dispute resolution that would re-
spond to the practical nature of business. See Mixed Claims, supra note 6, at 529; see also
Note, Effect of the United States Arbitration Act, 25 Geo. L.J. 443, 445-46 & n.20 (1937)
(businessmen preferred to settle disputes according to practical considerations, rather
than principles of law).
32. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982)).
33. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an ex-
isting controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
The Act also gives the courts of the United States power to stay federal proceedings
where the issue therein is referable to arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982), and provides
that where a party fails to arbitrate under the agreement, the party may petition any
federal district court to compel arbitration in accordance with the agreement. See 9
U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Section 10 permits vacation of an arbitration award upon motion of
any party under limited circumstances. See 9 U.S.C § 10 (1982). See infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
34. See 9 U.S.C § 2 (1982); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
219 (1985) ("The legislative history of the [Arbitration] Act establishes that the purpose
behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to
arbitrate."); Allison, supra note 26, at 227 ("The Arbitration Act goes far beyond merely
validating arbitration clauses and in several ways mandates the active involvement of
federal courts in implementing the Act's pro-arbitration policy."); Mixed Claims, supra
note 6, at 530 ("Courts can no longer refuse to enforce valid arbitration agreements be-
tween parties.").
35. An agreement to arbitrate is valid "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C § 2 (1982).
1987]
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provisions.36 Congress intended to reduce the burdens of litigation
through a guarantee of access to swift and cost effective fora for dispute
resolution.37 This intent has been implemented through an expansive
construction of the Arbitration Act" and a liberal interpretation of arbi-
tration agreements.39
The Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,40 addressed
the question whether district courts must compel arbitration of pendent
state law claims when federal securities claims will be heard in federal
court.41 The Court held that the language and the legislative intent of
the Arbitration Act mandate that parties shall proceed to arbitration on
all matters within the scope of their agreement.42 Compelling the arbi-
tration was deemed necessary to protect both the contractual rights of
the parties4 3 and their rights under the Arbitration Act.' The Court,
therefore, held that state law claims must proceed to arbitration, even
36. See H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (purpose of the Act was to
place an arbitration agreement "upon the same footing as other contracts, where it be-
longs"), quoted in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). Con-
gress noted that the Arbitration Act "creates no new legislation, grants no new rights,
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts. . . ." 65 Cong. Rec.
1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).
37. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d
Cir. 1942) (" 'It is particularly appropriate that the action should be taken at this time
when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These
matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements
are made valid and enforceable.' ") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924)); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va. L. Rev. 265, 269
(1926) ("The evils which arbitration is intended to correct are three in number: (1) The
long delay... [due to the] great congestion of the court calendars .... (2) The expense
of litigation. (3) The failure, through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when
measured by the standards of the business world.").
38. See, e.g., Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S.
449, 452-53 (1935) (section 3 of the Arbitration Act interpreted expansively to effectuate
congressional purpose); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,
410 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[A]ny doubts as to the construction of the Act ought to be resolved
in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration both to accord with the original
intention of the parties and to help ease the current congestion of court calendars.").
39. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983); Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981); Becker
Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 44-45 (3d Cir.
1978); see also Allison, supra note 26, at 230 (arbitration clauses are given expansive
interpretation).
40. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
41. See id. at 214.
42. See id. at 217-19. In Byrd, the plaintiff brought an action in federal district court
alleging violations of §§ 10(b), 15(c) and 20 of the Exchange Act and various state laws.
Id. at 214. When plaintiff invested funds with defendant, plaintiff signed a customer's
agreement that any controversy arising out of the contract be settled by arbitration. Id.
at 215. Defendant filed a motion to sever the pendent state law claims, compel arbitra-
tion of those claims and stay the arbitration pending resolution of the federal litigation.
Id.




when parallel proceedings in separate fora would result.45
The Court further ruled that motions to stay arbitration pending judi-
cial resolution of the federal securities claims must be denied,46 noting
that the Arbitration Act requires the arbitration to proceed without de-
lay.47 Prior to Byrd, lower courts sought to protect their jurisdictional
interest in hearing claims under section 10(b) from the preclusive effect
of a prior arbitral determination of related state law claims.4" This was
accomplished either by denying arbitration of the pendent claims49 or
staying the arbitral proceedings.50 The Byrd Court stated, however, that
a stay of arbitral proceedings is not necessary to protect the federal
court's jurisdictional interest,51 and therefore directed arbitration and lit-
igation of the respective state and federal claims to proceed
simultaneously. 52
45. See id. at 217.
46. See icL at 222 (a stay is not needed to protect the federal interest in adjudication of
federal securities claims).
47. See id at 225 (White, J., concurring) ("[b]elated enforcement" of the Arbitration
Act frustrates purpose of agreements to arbitrate so arbitration and litigation should pro-
ceed simultaneously).
48. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1026 (1 1th
Cir. 1982) (denial of arbitration is necessary "to protect the jurisdiction of the federal
court and avoid any possible preclusive effect"); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d
318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal court must protect its exclusive jurisdiction).
49. See, eg., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1026
(11th Cir. 1982) (district courts should not sever arbitrable claims when they are "inextri-
cably" intertwined with nonarbitrable claims); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d
318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to compel arbitration of pendent state law claims);
Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 582 (E.D. Cal. 1982)
(denying motion to compel arbitration of pendent claims). This approach relied on the
judicially created "doctrine of intertwining," which requires a refusal to compel arbitra-
tion when the same factual and legal conclusions must be drawn from common eviden-
tiary facts. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1981).
Courts utilized this exception to the Arbitration Act to protect exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over securities claims from the potential collateral estoppel effect of the prior arbitra-
tion. Ia The courts also felt that it would be inefficient to bifurcate a mixed claim
lawsuit because it would frustrate the purpose of the Arbitration Act to promote speedy
and efficient dispute resolution. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552,
554 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 584. See
generally Mixed Claims, supra note 6, at 540-47 (analyzing court approaches to inter-
twined claims); Severability of Claims, supra note 7, at 1168-70 (same).
50. See, eg., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 62-63
(8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the intertwining doctrine and directing lower courts to stay
arbitration pending judicial resolution of federal securities claims to protect federal juris-
diction); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 318 (6th Cir. 1983) (" 'district
court has discretion to stay arbitration .... [to] preserve its full authority to decide the
nonarbitrable issues without any collateral estoppel consequences from a prior arbitra-
tion'" (quoting Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981) (em-
phasis in original))).
51. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985) ("neither a stay
of proceedings, nor joined proceedings, is necessary to protect the federal interest in the
federal-court proceeding").
52. See id at 223 (district courts should not manipulate the ordering of bifurcated
proceedings); id at 225 (White, J., concurring) (presumption should be that proceedings
will go forward simultaneously).
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By confirming the right to enforce an agreement to arbitrate pendent
state law claims,53 without determining the arbitrability of the federal
claim,54 the Byrd decision created the need to determine the preclusive
effect of an arbitral determination in federal securities litigation."
Although the Court suggested that it is uncertain that such arbitral de-
terminations will have any preclusive effect on the litigation of nonarbi-
trable federal securities claims,56 it nevertheless required district courts
to take into account federal interests in framing rules of preclusion.5
The lower courts are left, therefore, to consider what preclusive weight, if
any, shall be given prior arbitral determinations in federal securities
litigation.5"
II. APPLICATION OF PRECLUSION TO PRIOR ARBITRATIONS
A. The Preclusion Doctrine
To accomplish its function of dispute resolution,59 the civil court sys-
tem requires a mechanism that provides an end to litigation: Courts
have created doctrines of preclusion61 to ensure judicial finality. 62 Claim
53. Id. at 221.
54. Id. at 216 n.1; see also supra note 8 (addressing the arbitrability of § 10(b) claims).
55. See id. at 223 ("The question of what preclusive effect, if any, the arbitration
proceedings might have is not yet before us ... and we do not decide it.").
56. See id. at 222 ("[lIt is far from certain that arbitration proceedings will have any
preclusive effect on the litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims.").
57. See id. at 223 ("Suffice it to say that in framing preclusion rules in this context,
courts shall take into account the federal interests warranting protection.") (dictum).
58. Whether a court orders the proceedings to go forward simultaneously, see Girard
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1986); Bustamante v.
Rotan Mosle, Inc., 802 F.2d 815, 817 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (presumption should be that
arbitration and litigation "will each proceed in its normal course"), or stays the federal
proceedings pending arbitration, see, e.g., Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1986); Jope v. Bear Stearns & Co., 632 F. Supp.
140, 144 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Leone v. Advest, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 297, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 567-68 (N.D. Cal. 1984), it is likely that an
arbitrator's decision will precede disposition of the federal litigation. See Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 748-49 & n.3 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(arbitration is swifter and less expensive than litigation); Bustamante v. Rotan Mosle,
Inc., 802 F.2d 815, 817 (5th Cir. 1986) (unlikely that judicial proceedings will reach
conclusion before arbitral proceedings); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
693 F.2d 1023, 1025 (1 lth Cir. 1982) ("Arbitration provides a speedier.., method of
dispute resolution than does litigation .... ). Thus, the district courts will need to deter-
mine what weight, if any, should be given to the arbitral result. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 223
("The [preclusive] effect of an arbitration proceeding is at issue only after arbitration is
completed ....").
59. See Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897) ("[T]he very object
for which civil courts have been established ... is to secure the peace and repose of
society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination."); see also Mon-
tana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (finality is a major goal of the judicial
process).
60. See Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897) (rule preventing
duplicitous litigation necessary to maintain social order).
61. See lB Moore, supra note 14, 1 0.405[11], at 257 ("The doctrine of [preclusion] is
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preclusion bars a party from bringing suit on the same cause of action
already brought before another forum. 63 Issue preclusion prevents reliti-
gation of issues actually and necesarily determined in the prior suit,
although the second suit may be based on a different cause of action.6
Rules of preclusion aid in conserving judicial resources, preventing in-
consistent judgments, eliminating vexatious litigation and promoting
public confidence in the judiciary.65 Preclusion is not granted when the
a judge-made doctrine and exemplifies the important public policy that litigation come to
an end.").
The terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" are the modem terms for res
judicata and collateral estoppel, respectively. Originally, the term res judicata was used
to refer to a variety of concepts regarding the preclusive effects of a judgment in a subse-
quent action. See lB Moore, supra note 14, 0.40511], at 178; 18 Wright, supra note 10,
§ 4402, at 6; Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine,
55 Ind. L.J. 615, 615-16 (1980). Used in this broad sense, res judicata encompasses the
effect of a final judgment both as a bar to further action upon the same claim, and as an
estoppel as to matters necessarily litigated, although the claim in the subsequent action is
different. lB Moore, supra note 14, 0.405[l], at 178. Recent cases tend to limit the
term res judicata to the former usage and utilize the term collateral estoppel to indicate
the latter. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 & n.5 (1980) (noting the limited inter-
pretation of res judicata); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 & n.5 (1979)
(using res judicata in its limited sense); 18 Wright, supra note 10, § 4402, at 8-11. For
clarity, this Note uses the term claim preclusion to denote the operation of a judgment as
a bar to further action on that claim and issue preclusion to indicate an estoppel as to
issues previously determined. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 n.5 (1980) (noting
terminology of claim and issue preclusion).
62. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) ("Application of both
doctrines [claim and issue preclusion] is central to the purpose for which civil courts have
been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions."); see
also Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (preclusion ensures judicial finality); Hart
Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917) (Preclusion "is a rule of
fundamental and substantial justice, 'of public policy and of private peace'... .") (citing
Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907)); 18 Wright supra note 10, § 4403 (enumeration
of public and private values served by preclusion doctrines).
63. Under claim preclusion, "a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by
parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153 (1979). See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979);
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); 1B Moore, supra note 14, 0.405[1], at 181; 18 Wright,
supra note 10, § 4407, at 48. Claim preclusion bars not only issues actually raised in the
prior proceeding, but bars relitigation of all issues that could have been brought in the
prior action. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S.
351, 352 (1876).
64. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979); Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876). Before the defense of issue preclusion may be
invoked, certain prerequisites must be met: (1) the issue must be the same as that in-
volved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior
action; and (3) the determination of the issue must have been an essential part of the
judgment in the prior action. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 1985); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 704 F.2d 241, 243-44 (5th
Cir. 1983); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 932 (1983).
65. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440
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opposing party shows that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to
litigate that issue in the earlier action.66 By preventing unnecessary du-
plicative litigation and promoting speedy yet efficient claim resolution,67
the doctrine of preclusion is in harmony with the Arbitration Act's goal
of promoting efficient dispute resolution.68 In the context of securities
litigation, courts are reluctant to utilize claim preclusion, which would
bar federal litigation,69 finding issue preclusion to be a more appropriate
preclusive mechanism.7 °
U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies,
54 Geo. L.J. 857, 858 (1966).
66. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971); see also infra note 146 (discuss-
ing application of the full and fair opportunity test).
67. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
68. Compare Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (preclusion
reduces the expense that arises from multiple law suits and promotes judicial economy)
with Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir.
1982) (arbitration provides a quicker, less costly method of dispute resolution) and
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)) (arbitration helps conserve
judicial resources).
69. Courts and commentators generally state that a prior adjudication of state law
securities claims does not have claim preclusive effect on a subsequent suit under § 10(b).
See Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975);
Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); Capital Invs., Inc.
v. Bank of Sturgeon Bay, 430 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1978); see also 5C A. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lob-5 § 239, at
10-107 (1986) [hereinafter Jacobs] (a prior adjudication has no claim preclusive effect on
a subsequent lOb-5 suit); Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 943 (noting that
only one court found the requisite identity of claims required to bar lob-5 litigation on
the basis of claim preclusion). This conclusion is based on the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts to adjudicate § 10(b) claims, see 15 U.S.C § 78aa (1982); see also Clark v.
Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.) (exclusive jurisdiction precludes application of
claim preclusion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975), and the fact that an action under
Rule lOb-5 is a different cause of action than the state claim. See Clark v. Watchie, 513
F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Abramson v. Pennwood Inv.
Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); 5C Jacobs, supra, § 239, at 10-107. But see
Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (an
arbitration decision can have claim or issue preclusive effect even if the underlying claim
involves the federal securities laws); Schattner v. Girard, Inc., 668 F.2d 1366, 1369 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (same); O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 C 3181 slip
op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1987) (same); Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 29-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
70. Courts recognize issue preclusion as a defense regardless of whether the prior
determination was made by a state court or by an arbitration panel. See, e.g., Greenblatt
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361-62 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (issue preclu-
sion applied to facts determined in arbitration); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975) (prior state court determination may have issue
preclusive effect on securities litigation); Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105, 108
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971) (issue preclusion applies where state court
determined an issue arising in subsequent federal litigation); Abramson v. Pennwood Inv.
Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968) (to the extent that state and federal suits are
based on the same facts, issue preclusion may apply). See generally 5C Jacobs, supra note
69, at § 239 (discussing applicability of claim and issue preclusion in the context of lob-5
litigation); Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 941-47 (same); Note, Res
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B. Supreme Court Precedent for Granting Preclusive
Effect to Prior Arbitrations
The Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 1 which requires federal
courts to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as
would the courts of a state rendering the judgment,7 does not apply to
arbitrations.7 3 Any rule of preclusion for arbitral determinations, there-
fore, is judicially fashioned.74
The Supreme Court has not yet considered the degree of preclusive
effect to be accorded a prior arbitral determination in a subsequent fed-
eral securities action.75 The Court has addressed the issue of granting
preclusive effect to arbitration where other federal statutory rights are
implicated.76 In these other contexts, the Court has determined the de-
gree of preclusive effect to be granted an arbitral determination by ana-
lyzing the extent to which the right at issue is intended to be judicially
enforceable 7 and the adequacy of arbitral proceedings in adjudicating
that right.78
When a statute creates an express right of action79 and grants federal
Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determina-
tions, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1360, 1382-85 (1967) (discussing applicability of preclusion to re-
lated state court determinations when exclusive jurisdiction lies with federal courts).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
72. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287 (1984).
73. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985); McDonald v.
City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-88 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456
U.S. 461, 477 (1982).
74. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 288 (1984).
75. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985). The Byrd
Court stated that it is unlikely that arbitration will have any preclusive effect on the
litigation of nonarbitrable federal securities law claims. Id at 222. The Court went on to
state that arbitration proceedings will not necessarily preclude federal litigation, implying,
arguably, that preclusion is, at least theoretically, possible. Id at 223. Ultimately, the
Court directed lower courts to consider federal interests in framing preclusion rules,
thereby recognizing the potential applicability of the doctrine. Id
76. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (determining
preclusive weight of arbitration on subsequent federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 729-30 (1981) (determin-
ing preclusive effect of labor arbitration on action under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974)
(determining preclusive effect of arbitration in the context of federal action under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
77. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 739-41 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-49 (1974).
78. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 742-45 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-60 (1974).
79. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (42 U.S.C. § 1983
creates express right of action); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728,
740 n.16 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act expressly permits individuals to bring an
action); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (Title VII grants pri-
vate litigants express right of action).
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courts jurisdiction to hear the claims,"° the judiciary has an obligation to
protect the federal right.8 When the arbitration does not offer the proce-
dural reliability of judicial disposition, its factual or legal determinations
should not be permitted to intrude upon the federal right.82 The Court,
therefore, has consistently concluded that preclusion cannot be applied
to bar a federal action when the court's jurisdiction is conferred by stat-
ute and the arbitration is procedurally inadequate to protect the parties'
federal rights.83
The question of arbitral reliability focuses on the expertise and author-
ity of the arbitrator84 and the general standards of arbitration.8" An arbi-
trator may lack the expertise necessary to adjudicate questions of federal
law.86 Because arbitrators are trained in "the law of the shop," statutory
or constitutional questions are beyond their realm of competence.8 7
Moreover, because the arbitrator's authority emanates from the contract,
she is neither required nor permitted to use congressional policy concerns
in making a determination.88 Furthermore, the procedural limitations
80. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) ("statu-
tory enforcement scheme [of Fair Labor Standards Act] grants individual employees
broad access to the courts"); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974)
(final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested in federal courts).
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) does not expressly confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts, the Supreme Court has established such jurisdiction. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 239 (1972) ("[s]ection 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens");
Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1982); see also McDonald v. City
of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) ("Because § 1983 creates a cause of action, there
is, of course, no question that Congress intended it to be judicially enforceable.").
81. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); see also Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 961 ("A federal court must first consider its obliga-
tion to protect its exclusive jurisdiction.").
82. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289-92 (1984).
83. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745-46 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-60 (1974).
84. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743-44 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974).
85. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
86. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) ("the specialized
competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land"); see also McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (quoting Alex-
ander, 415 U.S. at 57); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743
(1981) (same).
87. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981); Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) ("the resolution of statutory or consti-
tutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts").
When issues under federal law are substantially similar to those under state law, con-
cern over the limited expertise of the arbitrator may be eliminated. See infra notes 121-22
and accompanying text.
88. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981) ("[E]ven
though a particular arbitrator may be competent to interpret and apply statutory law, he
may not have the contractual authority to do so."); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
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inherent in arbitrations 9 cast doubt on the adequacy of its result where
federal rights are implicated. 90 The combination of these factors moti-
vated the Court to establish a general bar to the application of issue pre-
clusion, rather than inquire into the reliability of the arbitration on a case
by case basis. 91
The Court's analysis suggests that when a federal statute creates an
express right to a judicial forum, the inability of arbitration to protect the
federal jurisdictional interest prevents the arbitration from precluding
subsequent federal litigation.92 In Byrd" the Court indicated that the
implied right of action under section 10(b) 94 and Rule lOb-595 creates
sufficient federal interest either to limit significantly or to deny preclusive
effect to arbitral determinations in subsequent federal securities litiga-
tion.96 The degree of preclusive effect, if any, to be granted to securities
arbitration, therefore, depends on two factors. The first is whether the
Exchange Act mandates judicial resolution of claims arising under sec-
415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974) (arbitrator has no authority to invoke public laws and is limited
to resolving questions of contractual rights).
The Court has noted that because contractual and statutory rights have legally in-
dependent origins, they should remain equally available to the injured party to preserve
the statute's efficacy. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974).
89. The Court has raised concerns over the procedural inadequacies of arbitration,
such as: "'[tihe record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete [as a judicial
record]; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to
civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony
under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable."' McDonald v. City of W. Branch,
466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58
(1974)). For a discussion of arbitral procedures see infra notes 124-29 and accompanying
text.
90. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (because arbitra-
tion does not provide adequate substitute for judicial trial, according preclusive effect to
arbitration might undermine efficacy of the federal statute); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) ("congressionally granted... rights are best pro-
tected in a judicial rather than in an arbitral forum"); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974) (informality of arbitration makes it a "less appropriate forum" for
safeguarding rights under Title VII).
91. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
92. Lower courts have expanded the Supreme Court's analysis to the express right of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). See Wilmington v. J.1. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909,
917-18 (8th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 1102,
1105 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985).
93. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
96. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985). See also
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. This result has been reached in the context of
at least one other implied federal right of action. In an action under the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982), the court held that "although no direct
cause of action is granted by federal statute, we apply the Supreme Court's reasoning and
do not raise the insurmountable barriers of [preclusion]." Gonzalez v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 773 F.2d 637, 645 (5th Cir. 1985).
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tion 10(b).9 7 The second is whether the issue determinations made by an
arbitral forum are sufficiently reliable to effectuate congressional
purposes.98
III. THE FEDERAL INTEREST AND ARBITRAL ADEQUACY
A. The Federal Securities Acts
The Securities Act of 193399 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act"°
were designed to protect the investing public1"' through the establish-
ment of federal supervision over the securities market."0 2 Congress in-
tended private civil remedies to be an integral part of achieving this
goal. 103 Recognizing that purchasers of securities do not occupy equal
bargaining positions with issuers and broker/dealers,"°4 Congress in-
97. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
99. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm
(1982)).
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
101. Federal regulation of the securities industry emerged in response to the stock
market crash of 1929. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); Mixed
Claims, supra note 6, at 53 1. The basic purpose of the Securities Act and Exchange Act
is to protect investors against fraud and manipulation in the securities market. See 78
Cong. Rec. 2270 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Fletcher) (purpose of the bill is to bring safety to
the general public in the investment market), reprinted in 4 Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2270 (J. Ellenberger & E.
Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter Legislative History]; 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933) (President's
Message and Letter) (Securities Act is part of a broad scheme of protecting investors),
reprinted in 1 Legislative History at 937 (the President repeated his statement less than a
year later in 78 Cong. Rec. 7702 (1934), reprinted in 4 Legislative History at 7702); see
also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) ("[T]he basic purpose
of the [Securities] Act [is] to provide greater protection to purchasers of registered securi-
ties."); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("One of [the Exchange Act's]
central purposes is to protect investors .... "); 5 Jacobs, supra note 69, § 6.06, at 1-187
("The [Securities] and [Exchange] Acts are intended to protect investors.").
102. The Securities Act accomplished supervision by requiring full disclosure of infor-
mation in the issuance of securities. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History, supra note 101, at 1-5. The Exchange Act was intended to protect investors by
regulating transactions in the securities market. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 195 (1976); see S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legis-
lative History, supra note 101 at 1-5; see also 5 Jacobs, supra note 69, § 6.05, at 1-184 (a
purpose of the Exchange Act is the dissemination of information in the market place).
103. See 78 Cong. Rec. 2271 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) ("[I]f the exchanges
fail.., to maintain proper standards, the penalties of... effective civil liabilities attach in
order to insure that the standards laid down by the bill will be living standards and not a
mere dead letter of the law."), reprinted in 4 Legislative History, supra note 101, at 2271.
Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act impose civil liabilities for violations of the
registration and prospectus requirements. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771, 77o (1982). The
Exchange Act also includes express private rights of action in sections 9, 16 and 18. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r(a) (1982).
104. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) ("Securities Act was drafted with an
eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor."); Williams v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
753 F.2d 117, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Congress recognized inequality of bargaining power
between buyers and sellers); see also Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d
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tended both acts to give the investor added protection through access to
a federal forum,1" 5 thereby supplementing existing common law and fed-
eral and state statutory remedies."0 6
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,'0 7 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated
thereunder,108 were created to protect the investor against fraud." 9 The
right of action under Rule lOb-5, however, is implied. Because denial
of this implied right of access to a judicial forum would thwart congres-
Cir.) ("essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do not know
market conditions from the overreachings of those who do"), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1943); 5 Jacobs, supra note 69, § 6.04, at 1-182 to 1-183 (equalization of bargaining
positions as a policy underlying the Exchange Act).
105. Williams v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 753 F.2d 117, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)).
106. Section 16 of the Securities Act states that "[tihe rights and remedies provided by
this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may
exist at law or in equity." 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1982). A nearly identical provision is found
in § 28(a) of the Exchange Act. "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall
be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383
(1983) ("the remedies in each Act were to be supplemented by 'any and all' additional
remedies").
107. Section 10(b) reads in relevant part: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person .... (b)
[t]o use or employ.., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
108. Rule lOb-5 provides in relevant part: "[iut shall be unlawful for any person ....
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, .. . (c) [t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person.. . ." 17 C.F.R § 240.lOb-5 (1987).
109. The language of the statute and the Rule clearly focus on fraud and deception.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
110. There is very little evidence of legislative intent in the construction of § 10(b) or
Rule lob-5. See I Bromberg & Lowenfels, Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud,
§ 2.2(331), at 2:22 [hereinafter Bromberg & Lowenfels]; 5 Jacobs, supra note 69, § 5.01,
at 1-170 ("legislative history of Section 10(b) is so meager that little can be drawn from it
concerning the scope of lOb-5"). What little evidence exists, however, indicates that the
section was intended to be expansive. Thomas G. Corcoran, one of the drafters of § 9(c),
the predecessor to § 10(b) stated "[s]ubsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other
cunning devices.' ... [it] is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.", reprinted
in 5 Jacobs, supra note 69, § 5.01, at 1-165.
There is no indication in the language or legislative history of § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5
that Congress contemplated the creation of a civil right of action under this section. See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975). See generally I Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra,
§ 2.2(300-420), at 2:18-2:30 (legislative and administrative history of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5). The Supreme Court, however, has clearly established an implied private right of
action under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 380 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
The implication of a right under § 10(b) is necessary to effectuate congressional pur-
poses in regulating the securities industry. See Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
794 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1986) (§ 10(b) implies a private right of action because the
deterrent effect of a private remedy is necessary to effectuate control over the securities
industry); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (courts must "be alert
to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose").
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sional purposes, there is a strong federal interest in preserving jurisdic-
tion over Rule 10b-5 claims. 1" It, therefore, may not be infringed upon
by issue determinations of an alternate forum when that forum's proce-
dures cannot adequately protect the federal right under section 10(b).1 12
B. The Reliability of Arbitration
Because the federal courts have sufficient interest in protecting their
jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims,113 courts must decide whether the
arbitral procedures are inherently insufficient to safeguard the litigant's
federal rights. 14 Under the Supreme Court analysis, such insufficiency
would mandate a general denial of preclusive effect to arbitrators' find-
ings. 15 The arbitrator's inability to expertly adjudicate statutory or con-
stitutional claims," 6 and her limited scope of authority' 1 7 are significant
factors in denying preclusive effect to arbitral determinations." 8 This
has been of particular concern to the Court when constitutional rights or
considerations are implicated. 119 The Court is reluctant to foreclose fed-
eral consideration when an arbitrator has not addressed the constitu-
tional aspects of an individual's claim.' 20
Unlike federal statutes involving constitutional issues, there is substan-
111. Once a right has been implied under a federal statute, there is no justification for
granting it less protection than an express cause of action because "[t]o say that a private
cause of action is implied is to say that Congress intended such an action to exist." Wolfe
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 1986) (Tjofiat, J., concurring); see
Arbitrability of Claims, supra note 8, at 568-69 & n.139. Furthermore, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1982) expressly reserves exclusive federal jurisdiction over violations of the Exchange
Act or the rules and regulations thereunder. See Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra
note 12, at 940-47.
112. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 78, 84-90 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
117. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1984); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 744-45 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974).
118. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
119. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 286, 290 (1984) (petitioner's
§ 1983 claim that he was discharged for exercising his first amendment rights not pre-
cluded by arbitrator's determination of just cause for discharge); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (arbitral determination that petitioner had been
discharged for cause could not preclude claim of race discrimination brought under Title
VII). Cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 749 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("[Tlhere obviously is a vast difference between resolving allegations of
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act and settling a relatively typical and simple
wage dispute.... ."); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d
291, 297-98 (Ist Cir. 1986) (rights under the Exchange Act are distinguishable from con-
stitutional issues involved in Alexander and McDonald).
120. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) ("[A]lthough arbi-
tration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes, ... it cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional
rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard.").
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tial similarity between the purposes and policies underlying federal and
state securities laws-investor protection against fraud in the securities
industry.12 1 Because the issues in arbitration are substantially similar to
those reserved for federal adjudication, and involve parallel policy con-
siderations, the arbitrator will apply an analysis that is fundamentally
equivalent to that which a federal court would apply. The concern of
foreclosing relitigation of an issue that has not been given complete con-
sideration should not arise. These similarities between the underlying
concepts of federal and state securities actions, therefore, dispel the con-
cern over the limited expertise and authority of the arbitrator.'" Be-
121. Compare supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text (purpose and policies of fed-
eral securities laws) with, eg., State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 112-13, 618 P.2d 604,
606-07 (1980) (similarity between federal securities law and Arizona securities statute);
Polikoff v. Levy, 55 IlM. App. 2d 229, 233-34, 204 N.E.2d 807, 809, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
903 (1965) (federal and Illinois securities acts are "paternalistic" and are liberally con-
strued to protect public); Gardner v. Lefkowitz, 97 Misc. 2d 806, 812, 412 N.Y.S.2d 740,
746 (1978) ("The Martin Act [New York securities statute] and the Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934 ... are virtually identical in their design and scope, and the purpose for
which they were enacted.").
Although the elements of securities claims under federal and state laws are not identi-
cal, see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983); see also supra
note 70 and accompanying text, the concepts underlying the actions are the same. See
Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 582 (E.D. Cal. 1982) ("In
truth, the claims under Rule lOb-5 and the common law breach of duty, fraud, and negli-
gence claims appear to be nothing more or less than compatible theories of liability for
the same basic tort .... "). Indeed, the "doctrine of intertwining," see supra note 48 and
accompanying text, used by federal courts before Byrd to protect exclusive jurisdiction
over federal securities claims by denying arbitration of closely related arbitrable claims,
illustrates the underlying conceptual similarities between federal and state securities ac-
tions. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1984), rey'd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023,
1026 (1lth Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335 (5th Cir. 1981);
see also 5 Jacobs, supra note 69, § 2, at 1-6 ("Common law has an important bearing on
lOb-5 because courts discussing the Rule frequently analogized to tort concepts."); 3 L
Loss, Securities Regulation 1430 (2d ed. 1961) ("lilt is impossible to describe the statu-
tory fraud concepts that have developed under the securities laws without some brief
summary of what has gone before.").
Furthermore, courts addressing the arbitrability of claims under § 10(b), see supra note
8, have noted the similarity between securities actions under federal law and common
law. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985) (White, J., con-
curring) (rule of nonarbitrability "is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action
is... not so different from the common-law action"); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Esta-
brook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 297-98 (1st Cir. 1986) (rights under Exchange Act
are more akin to commercial disputes than constitutional rights); Phillips v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1398 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Jus-
tice White's concurrence in Byrd); Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 526 (D. Md. 1986)
(same); Jope v. Bear Stearns & Co., 632 F. Supp. 140, 142-43 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (same).
An arbitrator skilled to decide issues under state securities laws or common law, there-
fore, will be able to give adequate protection to the federal interests at stake. See Glaber-
son, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 3, at I (securities
arbitrators have expertise to handle complicated issues in investor complaints).
122. Because state and federal securities actions are conceptually and circumstantially
similar, an arbitrator authorized to settle disputes arising from an agreement with a bro-
ker or dealer does not exceed his authority by deciding the factual issues underlying both
claims. A standard arbitration agreement may read as follows:
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cause the arbitrator may be sufficiently skilled to adjudicate securities
claims, an absolute bar to preclusion is not warranted.
The question of the procedural adequacy of the arbitral process,123
however, remains relevant to the question of whether the arbitration can
sufficiently safeguard the federal litigants' statutory rights under Rule
10b-5 and thereby carry preclusive weight in a judicial forum. Securities
arbitrators are not bound by formal rules of evidence. 24 While an arbi-
tration panel has the power to subpoena documents or witnesses, 25 the
parties to the arbitration lack the advantage of discovery.' 26 Arbitrators
need not make written findings of fact127 nor state the reasons underlying
Any controversy arising out of or relating to the account of the undersigned or
to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in ac-
cordance with the rules then in effect of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. or the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange or
the American Stock Exchange as the undersigned may elect.
Arbitrability of Claims, supra note 101, at 549 n.14 (1986) (quoting Liskey v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 315 n.2 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Option Agreement)). Be-
cause state law and common law fraud claims are within the arbitrator's authority, see
supra note 7, when factual issues are common to the state and federal actions, a determi-
nation of those issues is a valid exercise of the arbitrator's authority. See Greenblatt v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 753 F.2d 117, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1985); cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 752 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (wage dispute which
underlies a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act is within scope of arbitrator's
authority where he was conferred with power over "any controversy that might arise")
(emphasis in original).
123. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of securi-
ties arbitration, see Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 Fordham
L. Rev. 279, 285-89 (1984); Arbitrability of Claims, supra note 8, at 552-54.
124. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956) (arbitrators arc
not bound by rules of evidence); National Post Office Mailhandlers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); M. Domke, Commercial
Arbitration § 24:02, at 364 (1984) ("Arbitrators have [wide] discretionary power to admit
... any evidence. . . ."); Katsoris, supra note 123, at 286 (arbitrators given wide latitude
concerning admissibility of evidence); Commercial Arbitration Rule 31 (American Arbi-
tration Association 1986) ("conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary").
125. See Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980); Commercial Metals Co. v.
International Union Marine Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also M.
Domke, supra note 124, § 24:03, at 370 (arbitration statutes of 42 states and the United
States Arbitration Act give arbitrators the power to issue subpoenas to compel the ap-
pearance of witnesses and production of documents); Katsoris, supra note 123, at 286-87
& n.52 ("arbitrators ... shall have subpoena power as provided by law").
126. The parties to an arbitration lack the power to subpoena documents or witnesses.
See Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980) (parties to arbitration have no
right to discovery); Foremost Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D.
Pa. 1960) (arbitration rules do not provide parties with "the discovery procedures pro-
vided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); see also Katsoris, supra note 123, at 287
n.52 (contrasting judicial discovery procedures with those of securities arbitration).
127. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956) (arbitrators need
not disclose facts underlying their decisions); Ufheil Constr. Co. v. Town of New Wind-
sor, 478 F. Supp. 766, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (arbitrators need not make detailed findings
of fact), aff'd mem., 636 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1980); M. Domke, supra note 124, § 29:06, at
435-36 (arbitrators need not make formal findings of fact); Arbitrability of Claims, supra
note 8, at 553 (same).
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their decision.' 28 Finally, judicial review of arbitration awards is ex-
tremely limited." An arbitration conducted under these limitations,
therefore, may not fully guarantee that the parties' federal securities
claims are adequately protected.130
In appropriate circumstances, the need for promoting extrajudicial
methods of dispute resolution outweighs the right to a federal forum.'
3
'
If the facts of a case demonstrate that the parties in fact suffered no pro-
cedural deprivations 132 in arbitration, preclusion may be an appropriate
device for ensuring an end to litigation.1 33 The Supreme Court in Byrd
indicated that a federal court may grant an arbitral determination preclu-
sive effect provided it frames its preclusion rules in a manner consistent
with the federal jurisdictional interest.13 The securities laws create suffli-
128. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
129. Judicial review of arbitrations by federal courts is governed by § 10 of the Federal
Arbitration Act and is permitted only:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). Generally, an arbitration award will not be overturned by a court
for erroneous interpretation of the law or incorrect findings of fact. See French v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) ("An arbitrator's
decision must be upheld unless it is 'completely irrational'... .") (quoting Swift Indus. v.
Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972)). Indeed, arbitrators may not be
required to follow substantive principles of law. See M. Domke, supra note 124, § 25.01,
at 391 (arbitrators do not have to follow applicable law); Sterk, Enforceability of Agree-
ments to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 Cardozo L. Rev. 481,
483 (1981) ("Arbitrators in this country are not bound by substantive private law."). For
a general discussion of deficiencies in securities arbitration, see Arbitrability of Claims,
supra note 8, at 552-54.
130. Cf McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-92 (1984) (arbitration
cannot adequately protect rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (arbitration offers inadequate protection of rights
under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
56-60 (1974) (arbitration cannot protect rights under Title VII).
131. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 753 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("This Court ought not be oblivious to desperately needed changes to
keep the federal courts from being inundated with disputes of a kind that can be handled
more swiftly and more cheaply by other methods.").
132. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text; see also O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 C 3181, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1987) (preclusion
is necessary to prevent needless relitigation of issues).
134. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985) ("Suffice it to
say that in framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take into account the
federal interests warranting protection.") (dictum).
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cient federal interest to merit close analysis of arbitral adequacy. 1 35 Such
scrutiny reveals that arbitral determination of securities issues may not
always be insufficient to protect the litigants' statutory rights.' 36 The
conflict between the need for judicial economy1 37 and the need to protect
injured investors' statutory rights,1 38 therefore, may best be resolved by
permitting preclusion only in very limited circumstances.1 39
IV. WHEN SHOULD AN ARBITRAL ISSUE DETERMINATION
PRECLUDE RELITIGATION OF THE SAME ISSUE IN A
SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTION?
In formulating preclusion rules a court must try to reconcile the pur-
poses of statutes giving rise to litigation with those designed to control
litigation."4 A court must also be mindful of the congressional grant of
jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims to the federal courts.1 41 Accord-
ingly, a framework for applying issue preclusion that seeks to satisfy the
competing concerns of the Arbitration Act, 42 the Exchange Act 143 and
general notions of finality and economy, 144 must emphasize the federal
interest in preserving jurisdiction over securities claims.
A district court can best protect its jurisidictional interest 45 by first
requiring the proponent of preclusion to prove the reliability of the arbi-
135. See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 113-33 and accompanying text. Since Byrd, at least two lower
courts have determined that arbitral findings may be granted issue preclusive effect in
subsequent federal litigation. In Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d
1352 (1 lth Cir. 1985) the court interpreted Byrd and the McDonald line of cases as
prescribing
a case-by-case approach to determining the collateral estoppel effects of arbitra-
tion on federal claims, focusing on the federal interests in insuring a federal
court determination of the federal claim, the expertise of the arbitrator and his
scope of authority under the arbitration agreement, and the procedural ade-
quacy of the arbitration proceeding.
Id. at 1361. Thus, the court found that arbitration of the federal securities law violations,
alleged as predicate acts in a subsequent RICO claim, precluded relitigation of those
issues necessarily decided by the arbitrators. Id. at 1361-62.
In O'Neill v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 C 3181, slip op. (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 30, 1987), the court held that arbitral issue preclusion is not only applicable in fed-
eral securities litigation, but also necessary to protect the effectiveness of arbitration. Id.
at 7. Federal court review of the arbitration, which must be undertaken to determine if
the prerequisites of issue preclusion are met, ensures the investor's right to a federal fo-
rum for his securities claims. Id. Ultimately, issue preclusion could not be applied be-
cause the court could not determine that issues were necessarily litigated. Id. at 9-10.
137. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 75-83 & 99-111 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
140. Cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-38 (1953) (recognizing competing concerns
between the Securities Act and the Arbitration Act).
141. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 26-52 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 13-14 & 59-68 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
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tration.' 4 Initial inquiry into the prerequisites of preclusion,17 should
include an analysis of the standards of proof applied in arbitration. Issue
preclusion may not apply when there are shifts in the burden of proof or
changes in the requisite degree of persuasion between the two proceed-
ings.14 Discrepancies in standards of proof may foreclose a finding that
the arbitrator necessarily ruled on whether the offered proof was insuffi-
cient to meet the standards utilized in federal securites actions.149
If the court finds that the traditional criteria of issue preclusion are
met, the proponent of preclusion must further prove that the arbitration
had many or all of the same procedural guarantees provided in a judicial
proceeding. Fundamental to this inquiry is a finding that the parties
were represented by counsel. 50 The absence of attorneys in arbitration
should alert a court to the likelihood that the parties' claims in arbitra-
tion were not pressed vigorously.1
5 1
146. Under ordinary circumstances, issue preclusion is available without a need to
prove the quality of the prior determination. See 18 Wright, supra note 10, § 4423. Cus-
tomarily, the burden of pleading and proving the prerequisites of issue preclusion rests on
the proponent of preclusion, see Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1518 (9th
Cir. 1985); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1130 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); 18
Wright, supra note 10, § 4405, at 38. Preclusion is applied unless the opposing party
shows she was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first action. See Frye v.
United Steelworkers, 767 F.2d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir.) ("[W]hen all factors required for
[issue preclusion] are present, it is the party opposing preclusion who must demonstrate
that applying [issue preclusion] in a specific case would result in particularized unfairness
.... "), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 530 (1985); Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of Educ.,
715 F.2d 21, 26 (2d Cir. 1983) (preclusion is applied absent showing of particularized
unfairness). Requiring the proponent of preclusion to carry the full burden of demon-
strating the reliability of the particular arbitration assures that the federal right is not
erroneously supplanted. Permitting preclusion only on a showing of specific circum-
stances places primary emphasis on the right to a federal forum.
147. See supra note 64; see also O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No.
84 C 3181, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ii. Jan. 30, 1987) (application of issue preclusion failed
because court could not determine that issues were necessarily litigated). This Note con-
tends that even where a party meets the prerequisites to issue preclusion, the doctrine
may not be applied until the court examines the procedural aspects of the particular
arbitration. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
148. See Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1986); Guenther v.
Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 888 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985); 18
Wright, supra note 10, § 4422, at 209.
149. See O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 C 3181, slip op. at 9
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1987) (possibility that arbitrator applied "clear and convincing" stan-
dard of proof to unsuccessful common law claim made it impossible to infer that evidence
was insufficient under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of federal securities
litigation); infra note 166 and accompanying text.
150. Representation by an attorney in judicial proceedings is fundamental to notions of
due process. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (representation by counsel in
civil or criminal proceedings is an aspect of due process); Potashnick v. Port City Constr.
Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th Cir.) (litigants need "the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); M. Domke, supra note 124,
§ 24:01, at 362 ("[A] party has the right to be represented by an attorney at any time
during any part of the arbitration.").
151. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.
1985) (noting representation by counsel as aspect of arbitral reliability); Carlisle, Getting
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Access to discovery is strong evidence of arbitral reliabilitly.5 2 Dis-
covery promotes fairness by permitting parties to ascertain facts and in-
formation that may be exclusively within the possession of others.15 3
When a party is refused access to relevant information, it is unlikely that
she could adequately present her case. In such a situation, preclusion
might be inappropriate. 54
The proponent of preclusion should demonstrate that evidence
presented in arbitration conformed to the evidentiary standards utilized
in federal court.155 Without assurance that the arbitrator's decision
rested on evidence that would be admissible in federal court, a court
should not rely on the arbitral findings.156
Finally, the party seeking preclusion should prove that the parties had
the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses in arbitration. Cross-exami-
nation is a right of constitutional dimension 57 that reveals the potential
unreliability of a witness' testimony.1 58 Without the ability to test a wit-
ness' credibility, arbitral reliability is suspect. 59
The preceding factors are fundamental indicia of arbitral reliability.
This list is not, however, exclusive"6 and these factors need not all be
a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Make an Adminis-
trative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court ofLaw?, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 63, 98
(1986) (absence of counsel in prior proceeding may justify denial of preclusion).
Absence of counsel should not be conclusive evidence of arbitral unreliability. The
proponent of preclusion may prove to the court that even without counsel, the opposing
party vigorously pressed his claim in arbitration and suffered no deprivation from pro-
ceeding pro se.
152. Discovery entitles litigants to disclosure of all relevant, non-privileged informa-
tion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26; C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 81, at 540 (4th ed. 1983).
153. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958); Hick-
man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); C. Wright, supra, § 81, at 540; Carlisle, supra
note 151, at 86.
154. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 & n.15 (1979); see also
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discov-
ery limitations contribute to inadequacy of arbitration as a forum for federal securites law
claims); Carlisle, supra note 151, at 86-87, 97 (absence of discovery in alternate forum
casts doubt on the fairness of the prior proceeding).
If the proponent of preclusion can prove that discovery would not have provided the
other party with any additional evidence, the court remains free to find that the arbitra-
tion was reliable. See Carlisle, supra note 151, at 98.
155. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (all relevant evidence is admissible subject to specific limita-
tions); see also Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (fact that parties presented relevant evidence indicated arbitral reliability).
156. Arbitrations conducted without formal rules of evidence may decide issues on the
basis of evidence that would be inadmissible in a judicial proceeding. See M. Domke,
supra note 124, § 24:02, at 364-65; Carlisle, supra note 151, at 87.
157. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
158. See id. at 496-97; 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
159. See 5 Wigmore, supra note 158, § 1367, at 32; Carlisle, supra note 151, at 97.
Accord Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.
1985) (fact that parties examined and cross-examined witnesses in arbitration contributed
to a finding of arbitral reliability).
160. The foregoing factors are those aspects of judicial proceedings that affect due pro-
cess or the reliability of the evidence. Lesser factors affecting the formality of the arbitral
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present to apply preclusion. If the court is satisfied by a totality of the
circumstances that the parties suffered no disadvantage in arbitration, it
may, in its discretion,16' defer to the arbitrator's findings through the
doctrine of issue preclusion.162 This framework goes beyond the "full
and fair opportunity" test' 63 by placing the burden of proving arbitral
reliability upon the proponent of preclusion," thereby requiring the
court to examine the quality of the prior proceeding before invoking issue
preclusion.
Increasing the burden on the proponent of preclusion properly bal-
ances the interests of economy and finality with the Court's concern that
the federal forum be preserved.' 65  Delegating the additional burden of
proceedings may also be relevant to a finding of reliability, including the opportunity to
make opening and closing arguments, see K. Sinclair, Federal Civil Practice §§ 15.20,
15.43 (2d ed. 1986); see also Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352,
1361 (1lth Cir. 1985) (fact that parties made opening and closing arguments indicated
arbitral reliability), and written factual findings by the arbitrators or the ability to infer
such findings from the record. See M. Domke, supra note 124, § 24-07, at 386-87; see also
Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1985)
(although arbitration panel made no specific factual findings, the court inferred issues
which were necessarily determined).
161. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (1 1th Cir.
1985); O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 C 3181, slip op. at 6-7
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1987). Ordinarily, the degree of proof that is required in civil actions is
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Vogel v. American Warranty Home Serv.
Corp., 695 F.2d 877, 882 (5th Cir. 1983); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., 685 F.2d 1065,
1070 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 466 U.S. 435 (1984);
Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 425 F.2d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 878 (1970); McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 339, at 956-59 (E. Cleary
3d ed. 1984); McBaine, Burden of Proof- Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242, 245(1944). District court judges, therefore, should be guided by the preponderance standard
in exercising their discretion over issue preclusion.
162. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has stated
that the factflnding process in arbitration is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. See
McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984); Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974). If the arbitration is procedurally reliable, an assump-
tion of non-preclusion is no longer warranted and the arbitral determinations should be
given the same deference as determinations of a court. Accord Restatement (Second) of
Judgments §§ 83(2), 84(3) and comment (c) (1982).
163. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
165. In O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 84 C 3181, slip op.
(N.D. IM. Jan. 30, 1987), the court stated that federal court examination of the arbitration
that must precede application of issue preclusion is sufficient to ensure an investor's right
to a federal forum for her securities law claims. Id. at 7. The court in O'Neill held that
preclusion could not be applied because the record did not state what standard of proof
was used by the arbitrator, and it therefore was possible that the arbitrator did not neces-
sarily rule on whether the plaintiff's proof was insufficient to meet the standard utilized in
federal securities actions. Id at 9. While O'Neill's result is in accord with the Supreme
Court precedent that protection must be given to a federal statutory right, see supra notes
79-83 and accompanying text, its analysis must be carried further. The court correctly
found that the potential differences in standards of proof made preclusion inappropriate.
See supra note 154. Even when the standards are clearly the same, however, the court
cannot apply issue preclusion if the prior arbitration was procedurally deficient. A court
must go beyond the prerequisites of issue preclusion and examine the arbitration for spe-
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proving arbitral adequacy to the proponent of preclusion is necessary to
ensure that the plaintiff's rights under section 10(b) are effectively pro-
tected. '66 Permitting issue preclusion when procedural sufficiency has
been demonstrated, permits courts to effectuate the intent of the parties
to the arbitration clause.67 As a result, the burden on federal courts is
eased by promoting concepts of finality 6 ' and speedy resolution of
claims,169 thus serving the goals of the Arbitration Act.' 70
Denying preclusive effect to an arbitral decision does not render the
determination meaningless. The arbitral decision still is admissible as ev-
idence and accorded weight as the court deems appropriate.' 7' If, on the
other hand, the court grants preclusive effect to the arbitration, the strin-
gency of the proponent's burden1 72 ensures that the opposing party
merely is prevented from litigating identical issues in two fora.' 71
CONCLUSION
The federal courts have a strong interest in protecting rights granted
by federal statutes. The judiciary also has an interest in conserving its
resources, minimizing inconsistent results and establishing finality to liti-
gation. A court can best protect these countervailing interests in the se-
curities field by requiring proof of specific arbitral reliability before
precluding relitigation of the issue in a judicial forum. Delegation of the
burden of proof to the proponent of preclusion places primary emphasis
on the federal right to a judicial forum. Because preclusion can be ap-
plied only on a showing that the arbitration afforded the parties the op-
portunities available in judicial adjudication, the court has the power to
prevent unnecessary duplication where the arbitration clearly was relia-
cific indicia of reliability. Application of preclusion must be the exception, rather than the
rule, if the federal securities laws are to maintain their efficacy.
166. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 62 & 65 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 57 & 65 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text. An arbitration that offers all the
procedural guarantees of judicial adjudication likely will lose much of the efficiency for
which it was selected. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974)
("[lit is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient,
inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution."). Because a federal statutory
right is implicated, however, a great degree of reliability is required before a party may
preclude federal consideration of the claim.
171. Relevant factors to determine the weight given an arbitral decision include the
degree of procedural fairness in arbitration, the adequacy of the arbitral record and the
competence of the particular arbitrators. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S.
284, 292 n.13 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 n.22
(1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974).
172. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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ble. This model accommodates the competing federal concerns and pro-
poses a uniform standard for case by case analysis.
Beth H. Friedman

